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A FIXED RULE FOR A CHANGING WORLD:
THE LEGACY OF
LUCAS V. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL
J. Peter Byrne*
Editor’s Synopsis: In light of the 25th anniversary of the Supreme
Court’s Lucas decision, this Article reexamines the actual relevance of
the opinion by weighing the framing, reach, and aftermath of Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion. This Article argues that Justice Scalia’s
opinion consciously framed the regulatory takings doctrine in a more
favorable way for private property owners, and by doing so, helped pave
the way for subsequent denial that environmental and climate concerns
are a valid basis for any government action. Justice Scalia attempted to
create a regulatory environment that protects private real estate
investments instead of protecting the public environment as intended by
democratically enacted regulations, but courts have applied Lucas in a
more limited manner than Justice Scalia probably intended.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For some of us of a certain age, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council1 has been woven into the fabric of our professional lives. I wrote
an amicus brief in Lucas, under the auspices of the State and Local Legal
Center for a host of state and local government organizations, arguing in
*

J. Hampton Baumgartner Chair in Real Property Law, Georgetown University Law
Center. This Article is an edited version of a keynote address delivered at the 2017 ABA
Real Property, Trust & Estate Law Journal Symposium, “Takings and Coastal Management, a Quarter-Century after Lucas,” held at the University of South Carolina School of
Law. I am grateful for helpful comments on an earlier draft from Professor Timothy
Mulvaney.
1
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).

2
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support of the respondent.2 I attended the argument and was among those
startled and concerned about the opinion—not so much the reversal of the
South Carolina Supreme Court but the reasoning and rhetoric of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s opinion, which seemed to portend a revolution in regulatory takings law.3 My concern influenced my subsequent scholarship and
advocacy, but a revolution in takings law never occurred.
The conference topic was the legacy of Lucas from the perspective of
our time. To address that, I will discuss two aspects of the opinion. First,
how did it take the shape it did? The Court could have found for David
Lucas on much narrower grounds. Here, I’ll make some use of the Harry
Blackmun papers, lodged in the Library of Congress, which tell us
something about the Court’s deliberations.4
Second, and more significant, why do we commemorate the twentyfifth anniversary of Lucas with a scholarly conference? Of course, the case
has continuing importance for South Carolina and its eroding coastline. I
appreciate the opportunity to learn at the conference about how South
Carolina has coped with its continual and worsening coastal challenges in
the era of accelerating sea level rise despite Lucas. But what makes this
1992 decision of continuing national significance for takings law or the
environmental generally? Subsequent Supreme Court decisions arguably
have confined the Lucas holding to its own facts.5
Justice Blackmun anticipated the limited reach of the Lucas opinion
when he wrote in dissent: “Today the Court launches a missile to kill a
mouse.”6 But attack missiles often inflict “collateral damage.”7 Moreover,
they often are intended to send a message and deter future enemy action.
If the U.S. Supreme Court disliked the opinion of the South Carolina
2

See Brief of the U.S. Conference of Mayors et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent, Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (No. 91-453), 1992 WL
120064000.
3
See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise
of Background Principles as Categorial Takings Defense, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321,
321 (2005) (“Advocates for expanded property rights heralded the Supreme Court’s 1992
decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission [sic] as the dawn of the new era
. . . .”).
4
See generally Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Box no. 599, case 91-453 [hereinafter Blackmun Papers]. For general information about Justice Harry Blackmun’s papers, see the Library of Congress’s website,
http://www.loc.gov/rr/mss/blackmun/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2018).
5
See infra notes 118–124 and accompanying text.
6
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
7
Id. at 1037.
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Supreme Court,8 it had many avenues to reverse or vacate that decision
without creating a new per se rule. Similarly, if the Court was concerned
about the plight of David Lucas, it could have found for him easily within
the framework of established law. But, Justice Scalia’s opinion consciously set out to recast the regulatory takings doctrine in a new key—far more
helpful to property owners whose plans were stymied by environmental
regulations. The Lucas opinion represents the high-water mark of a
concerted effort by property rights advocates to use the Takings Clause to
check environmental regulation of land use.9 The decision did so by
creating a categorical rule looking only to the restriction on the proposed
development and excluding any serious assessment of the environmental
consequences of the development.10 Lucas has had surprisingly little
significance for subsequent regulatory takings decisions, but it contributed
to a polarized occlusion of environmental concerns evident today in the
denial of the reality of and risk from anthropogenic climate change.
We still live with influential politicians and industry policy entrepreneurs who refuse to acknowledge, let alone engage with, environmental
threats, particularly anthropogenic climate change, which had influenced
decisively the coastal regulations enfeebled by Lucas.11 Today, the federal
executive departments deny in bad faith the reality of human induced
climate change and the existential threat it poses, not just to beachfront
communities but to human civilization in general.12 Lucas fashioned a
constitutional means to protect private investments in real estate against
democratically enacted regulations without considering the public environmental harms those regulations attempted to mitigate. It is that legacy
8

See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991), rev’d 505 U.S. 1003
(1992).
9
See Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct “Spin” on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1411, 1425 (1993).
10
See, e.g., id. at 1423.
11
Jim Lakely, a spokesperson for the Heartland Institute, told the New York Times
that he hoped that world delegates at the recent international climate talks at Bonn,
Germany, would respond to his organization’s message: “‘Carbon dioxide is not a pollutant
and it is not the driver of global warming,’ he said. ‘So there is no moral case for restricting
the use of fossil fuels, especially because that is vital to raising the quality and length of
life of the world’s poorest people.’” Lisa Friedman, A Shadow Delegation Stalks the
Official U.S. Team at Climate Talks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/11/11/climate/un-climate-talks-bonn.html?_r=0.
12
See Coral Davenport, Climate Change Denialists in Charge, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/us/politics/climate-change-denialists-in-char
ge.html (quoting President Trump, calling climate change a “hoax”).
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that has become clearer from the perspective of twenty-five years and that
we need to confront today.

II. BACKGROUND
The U.S. Supreme Court decided Lucas against a particular legal and
cultural background. Two decades of environmental legislation at both the
federal and state levels had begun to address pollution and the degradation
of natural resources. This movement also sought to regulate, for ecological
goals, land development patterns, particularly on sensitive lands like
wetlands and coastal areas.13 Thus, Congress enacted the Coastal Zone
Management Act in 1972, encouraging states to regulate coastal areas.14
South Carolina responded with its Coastal Management Act15 in 1977,
which created the South Carolina Coastal Council16 and empowered it to
regulate structures in designated “critical areas.”17 Although the effort to
make land development more environmentally careful achieved only
sporadic legislative successes, there were signs courts were embracing a
conservation land ethic, too. The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s statement
on this matter became iconic: “An owner of land has no absolute and
unlimited right to change the essential natural character of his land so as
to use it for a purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state and
which injures the rights of others.”18
By the 1980s a property rights movement arose, which focused on the
Takings Clause as a means to oppose such regulation without taking issue
with the underlying goals for environmental protection.19 The regulatory
takings doctrine, as elaborated by the Court, supposes that a challenged
regulation is within the power of government if it furthers a “public use,”
13

See Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92–583, 86 Stat. 1280
(codified at 16 U.S.C. section 1451–64); see also ADAM ROME, THE BULLDOZER IN THE
COUNTRYSIDE 247–48 (Donald Worster & Alfred W. Crosby eds., 2001).
14
See 16 U.S.C. § 1452.
15
See South Carolina Coastal Management Act, 1977 S.C. Acts 224, No. 123
(codified at S.C. CODE ANN. sections 48-39-10–360 (Supp. 1977)). All state statutory
citations in this Article refer to the current statute unless otherwise indicated.
16
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-40 (Supp. 1977).
17
Id. § 48-39-80; see also Vicki Been, Lucas v. The Green Machine: Using the
Takings Clause to Promote More Efficient Regulation, in PROPERTY STORIES, 299, 306
(Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2009).
18
Just v. Marinette Cty., 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972).
19
See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION —
A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 183 (1991).
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but compensation must be paid because of the nature and gravity of the
burden it imposes on the owner.20 But, as advocates realized, making
regulators pay for the reductions in value the landowners suffered as a
result of regulation would make regulation too expensive, thus deterring
new regulation.21 Before William Rehnquist was appointed as Chief
Justice, the Court’s regulatory takings approach was amorphous, factspecific, and accommodating to regulations of use for diverse conservation
purposes even when they resulted in large reductions in the value of the
plaintiff’s property.22
The Supreme Court signaled its new commitment to property rights in
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,23 where the Court’s opinion by
Justice Scalia extolled the constitutional status of property rights and
invalidated a state program to enhance beach access.24 Nollan, however,
dealt only with permit conditions that modified an owner’s right to exclude
people rather than with regulatory limitations on the use of land.25 That
same term, environmental regulation, was bolstered by Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass’n. v. DeBenedictis,26 where the Court held coal
mining regulations did not constitute a taking, even though they were
remarkably similar to those in the foundational regulatory taking case of
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.27 In doing so, the Court took a broad
view of the affected property and affirmed the doctrinal significance of the
20

Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc, 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005).
See Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical
Analysis and Assessment of the Progress so Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 509 passim
(1998).
22
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (“[T]his
Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any ‘set formula’ for determining when
‘justice and fairness’ require that economic injuries caused by public action be
compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a
few persons.”).
23
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
24
See id. at 841–42; see also J. Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 CONST. COMMENT
239, 247 (1990).
25
See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827.
26
480 U.S. 470 (1987).
27
Compare Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (holding a coal mining
statute was a regulatory taking), with Keystone, 480 U.S. at 505–06 (holding that a nearly
identical statute to the one in Mahon was not a regulatory taking). “Although the Court
purported to distinguish Mahon rather than to overrule it, there is little doubt that Mahon
can no longer be considered good law with respect to the question whether anti-subsidence
laws give rise to a takings claim.” THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1226 (3d ed. 2017).
21
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State’s purpose of environmental protection.28 In its Keystone decision, the
Court reaffirmed the line of cases following Mugler v. Kansas,29 holding
that “the public interest in preventing activities similar to public nuisances
is a substantial one, which in many instances has not required compensation.”30 But by 1992, the dissenters in Keystone had joined a new majority
on the Court.31

III. FRAMING
In this Part, I want to sketch briefly the factors that led to Lucas
becoming a blockbuster opinion. As in many major cases, this was the
result of a blend of fate, happenstance, and intention. As suggested in the
prior Part, property rights advocates and environmentally-minded regulators were on a collision course at the end of the 1980s. Their engagement
came in South Carolina.
South Carolina had grown increasingly concerned about the effects of
development on coastal erosion, especially given growing awareness
about sea level rise.32 Consequently, the South Carolina Coastal Council
appointed a Blue Ribbon Committee to recommend changes in the Coastal
Act to address erosion.33 The Committee’s Report issued in 1987 noted the
inevitability of sea level rise, the damage done by recent storms, and the
futility of armoring the coastline.34 It concluded that “a retreat from the
beaches over a thirty year transition period, in combination with selective
beach nourishment, is the only practical approach to our coastal erosion
28

See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 506.
123 U.S. 623 (1887).
30
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 492.
31
Compare Keystone 480 U.S. at 506, with Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1005 (1992) (showing that the Justices who dissented in Keystone are now part of
the majority opinion in Lucas).
32
In 1984, EPA and the South Carolina Sea Grant program sponsored a
conference in Charleston, South Carolina to present the results of a
study on the impacts of future sea level rise on the city and the
surrounding barrier islands, with the latter organization mailing 10,000
brochures to people in the area.
James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to Save
Wetlands and Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279, 1334–35
(1995) (footnote omitted).
33
See id. at 1335.
34
See S.C. BLUE RIBBON COMM. ON BEACHFRONT MGMT., REPORT OF THE SOUTH
CAROLINA BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE ON BEACHFRONT MANAGEMENT ii-iii (1987)
[hereinafter BLUE RIBBON REPORT].
29
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problems.”35 In 1988, the South Carolina legislature revised its approach
to critical areas and enacted the Beachfront Management Act (BMA),
prohibiting construction or reconstruction seaward of a setback line based
upon a calculation of forty times the annual erosion rate.36 Although
entirely appropriate from a science-based natural resources protection
perspective, this regulatory approach created an ideal factual premise for
a regulatory takings claim.
The new BMA setback line prohibited all permanent development on
David Lucas’s two lots.37 He had recently purchased those remnant lots
for nearly $1 million from the Wild Dunes Associates, the development
company that developed a large gated community on the Isle of Palms.38
Lucas had been a principal of the company.39 If Wild Dunes itself had
sought and been denied permits to build on those two lots, it would have
had a much weaker takings claim because the lots likely would have been
viewed as part of a larger property that had been profitably developed.40
However, Lucas’s two lots were presumed to be legally distinct from all
of the other Wild Dunes properties from which he had profited.41
Moreover, all of the oceanfront lots in the vicinity of Lucas’s lots had
already been developed with expensive homes, making the prohibition on
building on his lots seem arbitrary or at least to secure minimal public
benefits.42
35

Id. at iii-iv. The Report stated:
Sea level rise in this century is a scientifically documented fact. . . . It
must be accepted that regardless of attempts to forestall the process, the
Atlantic Ocean, as a result of sea level rise and periodic storms, is
ultimately going to force those who have built too near the beach front
to retreat.
Id. at ii.
36
See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10 to -360 (1987 & Supp. 1988); see also Carol M.
Rose, The Story of Lucas: Environmental Land Use Regulation Between Developers and
the Deep Blue Sea, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 237, 261–63 (Richard J. Lazarus &
Oliver A. Houck eds. 2005).
37
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1006–07 (1992).
38
See id.
39
See id. at 1038 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
40
See David A. Dana, Why Do We Have the Parcel-as-a-Whole Rule?, 39 VT. L. REV.
617, 630–31 (2015).
41
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1020.
42
See Been, supra note 17, at 304–05. We may never know whether the transfer of
the lots to Lucas individually was fortuitous from the perspective of litigation strategy or
deliberate. See id. at 305. Justice Blackmun’s law clerk wrote him stating that there was
“something fishy” about the case based on her reading of the many transactions involving

8
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Lucas never applied for a permit to build but instead sued the South
Carolina Coastal Council (Council) claiming that the BMA had taken his
property.43 The Council crucially allowed Lucas to proceed, despite the
prevalence of standard ripeness requirements stated in the Supreme
Court’s decision in Williamson County,44 conceding that the Council
would deny any permit for construction on Lucas’s lots.45 In retrospect,
this was a damaging litigation decision.46 Requiring Lucas to go through
the permitting process would have delayed his takings claim and also
might have built an administrative record showing the continuing value of
his lots and documenting an environmental justification for a permit
denial.47 The Council did present evidence to the trial court explaining the
dynamics of erosion in the area of Lucas’s lots and the efforts made to
armor and renourish the shore, and it showed that Lucas’s lots had been
beneath the high water mark during the past forty years.48 The trial court
viewed such evidence as irrelevant given its finding that the regulations
deprived Lucas of any reasonable economic use of his lots.49 This created
the highly artificial premise in the case that the lots had zero economic
value.50
The South Carolina Supreme Court held categorically that the
regulations did not effect a taking because they were intended to prevent
significant public harm.51 In so holding, the court relied on the stated
legislative purposes of the BMA, which Lucas had stipulated, but did not
the lots and their rapid rise in value. Letter from Law Clerk for Justice Harry A. Blackmun,
to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Feb. 28, 1992), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 4. Professor
Vicki Been’s historical analysis of the case reasonably surmises that Lucas must have
known about the likelihood of imminent, strict regulations of coastal development as the
South Carolina legislature debated how to implement the Blue Ribbon Committee’s
recommendations. See Been, supra note 17, at 304–06. At the time of purchase, Lucas was
an experienced coastal real estate investor. See id. at 304.
43
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009; see also Been, supra note 17, at 306, 309.
44
See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 173
(1985) (holding that a takings claim was not ripe because the respondent had not received
a final decision regarding an ordinance and had not exhausted her state remedies).
45
See Been, supra note 17, at 309–10, 324.
46
See id. at 325.
47
See id. at 324–25.
48
See id. at 311–12.
49
See id. at 310.
50
See id. at 309.
51
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 895 (S.C. 1991) (discussing the
conclusions of the trial court), rev’d 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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reference any of the evidence the Council presented at trial about erosion
threats to Lucas’s lots.52 The court relied principally on the U.S. Supreme
Court precedents,53 which held that regulations that prevent harm to the
public cannot be considered a taking even if they involve a significant loss
of economic value.54 The court’s approach was largely consistent with
those precedents, although none of them clearly involved a property that
had been deprived of all economic value.55 Moreover, the court did not
review the foundation for the trial court’s conclusion that the lots had no
economic value.56 Finally, the court rejected the Council’s request to
remand the case to consider the effects of the special permit provision
adopted in 1990.57 In all this, the South Carolina Supreme Court acted
upon principle, but in the context of that time, it teed up a perfect case for
property rights advocates to bring to a new majority on the U.S. Supreme
Court.
Lucas’s petition for certiorari presented the U.S. Supreme Court with
a clean and appealing question: does a land-use regulation, pursuant to a
state’s police power, require just compensation under the Constitution’s
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments if it totally eliminates the value of
private property?58 This was a question of first impression for the Court,
but it found apparent support in language from Agins v. City of Tiburon,59
where the Court stated: “The application of a general zoning law to
particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable
use of his land.”60 In Agins, the Court unanimously upheld the rezoning of
the petitioner’s lots, finding that they had substantial economic value, and
rendering that loose and erroneous statement mere dicta.61
52

See id.
See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
54
See Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 899.
55
See id. at 898–900; see also Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491–95.
56
See Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 900.
57
See id. at 908.
58
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007 (1992).
59
447 U.S. 255 (1980), abrogated by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528
(2005).
60
Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
61
See id. at 258–59. Agins was one of a series of cases in which the Court tried to
address whether states had to provide property owners with an inverse condemnation
remedy that would afford compensation at least for a temporary taking, but found for
various reasons that it could not reach that question. See id. at 263. In Agins the Court’s
53
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Yet, the granting of the petition was not a foregone conclusion. The
petition for certiorari was held over at least once because of some Justices’
concerns about the procedural posture of the case.62 Justice O’Connor
wrote in a memorandum to the conference on November 4, 1991, that she
believed that Lucas’s claim was ripe only for a temporary taking.63 She
reasoned that Lucas could now apply for a special permit and there was
“no reason to grant plenary review of a statute that since has been
amended, [she was] inclined to suggest that [the Court] summarily reverse
the judgment insofar as it address the temporary taking, and otherwise
deny.”64 Justice White may also have been worried about whether even a
temporary taking could be found, given that Lucas never applied for a
permit and the record did not reveal whether he was ready to build or was
holding the land at the time of suit for better market conditions.65 Justice
Blackmun’s merit conference notes suggest that Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia had been the most adamant about granting certiorari, as

statement of the standard for finding a regulatory taking seems summary and sloppy. See
id. at 260. It created lots of mischief. The first prong, which states that a taking should be
found when a regulation failed to advance a legitimate state interest (actually a due process
test), see id., finally was unanimously and apologetically rejected by the Court in Lingle v.
Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). For the clear rule presented as the second prong,
see Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. The Agins Court cited Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978), see Agins, 447 U.S. at 260, where Justice
Brennan wrote for the majority:
We emphasize that our holding today is on the present record, which in
turn is based on Penn Central’s present ability to use the Terminal for
its intended purposes and in a gainful fashion. The city conceded at oral
argument that if appellants can demonstrate at some point in the future
that circumstances have so changed that the Terminal ceases to be
“economically viable,” appellants may obtain relief.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 138 n.36. But Penn Central hardly states a categorical
rule; for example, the Court had not considered the historic preservation of Grand Central
Station to protect the public against harm. See id. at 130.
62
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 1061 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (dissenting over procedural concerns).
63
See Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (Nov. 4,
1991), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 4.
64
Id.
65
See Oral Argument at 22:13–23:05, Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 (No. 91-453),
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-453.
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they stressed the importance of the case.66 In any event, the Court granted
certiorari on the question as presented.67
As Justice O’Connor’s memorandum suggests, the Court had a wide
range of ways to address the case, even assuming that the South Carolina
Supreme Court’s approach seemed insufficiently protective of property
rights.68 The Bush Justice Department’s brief argued for a modest resolution, reversing the South Carolina court’s decision and remanding for
consideration about the weight of the state’s environmental interest and
the fit between that interest and the statutory structure.69 The brief affirmed
the Mugler line of cases and argued that the state had a special authority
to regulate land use to protect the public against harm, which went beyond
common law nuisance, even when it imposed serious economic losses on
individual owners.70 Furthermore, the brief objected that the South
Carolina court had treated the nuisance exception as coterminous with the
police power, so it recommended that the South Carolina court’s decision
be vacated and the case remanded.71 The Solicitor General, Kenneth Starr,
thus showed the Court how to limit the reach of Keystone Coal, while
leaving room for accommodating property rights with environmental protection.72 The brief also suggested that the Court could vacate the decision
below and remand for consideration of ripeness, given the availability of
the special permit under the 1990 amendments.73
The oral argument focused primarily on establishing or challenging
whether the case actually presented the question of whether a regulation
that denies an owner all economic use of his land is a taking.74 Counsel for
Lucas stated the proposition immediately, and the Chief Justice quickly
66

See Memorandum: Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council Merit Conference Notes from
Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Mar. 4, 1992), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 4.
67
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1010.
68
See Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, (Nov. 4,
1991), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 4.
69
See Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal at 26–28, Lucas,
505 U.S. 1003 (No. 91-453), 1991 WL 11004086.
70
See id. at 19.
71
See id. at 8, 28.
72
See id. at 21–22.
73
See id. at 11.
74
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 (No. 91-453),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/pdfs/transcripts/1991/91-453_03-02-1992.pdf. The transcript fails to identify the Justice asking each question, but that can be ascertained by
listening to the sound recording of the oral argument. See generally Oral Argument, Lucas,
505 U.S. 1003 (No. 91-453), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-453.
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asked whether it was “perfectly clear from the opinion of the majority in
the [S]upreme [C]ourt of South Carolina that they accepted the hypothesis
that he was denied all economically viable use of his land?”75 Justices
Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter all expressed discomfort with the zero
valuation,76 and Justice Blackmun asked Lucas’s advocate if he would
give him the property because it was worthless.77 Justice O’Connor
expressed reservations about whether the case presented a permanent
taking, given Lucas’s opportunity to seek a permit under the 1990 amendments.78 Justice White queried whether there had been even a temporary
taking, because the record did not show that Lucas would have built in the
two years before the amendment was adopted.79
The argument for the Council was mostly disastrous. Counsel sought
to defend the state supreme court’s holding that the regulation could not
be a taking because it prevented harm to the public.80 Justice Scalia
aggressively questioned counsel about what harm there could be from
building another house behind the sand dunes among the other houses.81
Justice O’Connor questioned whether the rationale relied on by the state
court would justify ordering the removal of the existing oceanfront houses
seaward of the setback line;82 she appeared frustrated at counsel who was
not articulating a limiting principle to the no compensation rationale.83
Justice Scalia pressed his view that the 1990 special permit provision did
not require a remand because ripeness concerns are prudential and
discretionary.84 Justice White took counsel to have conceded that at least
a temporary taking was before the Court.85
Justice Blackmun’s conference notes report his impressions of the
views of his colleagues.86 A caveat is that the notes are hand written and
75

Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 74, at 3.
Oral Argument, supra note 74, at 1:52, 13:41, 19:33.
77
See id. at 1:57.
78
See id. at 7:37-8:59.
79
See id. at 10:45.
80
See, e.g., id. at 28:57–42:54.
81
See id. at 34:14–35:05.
82
See id. at 36:09, 36:56.
83
See id. at 40:10.
84
See id. at 53:26, 54:51.
85
See id. at 55:40.
86
See Memorandum: Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council Merit Council Notes from Justice
Harry A. Blackmun (Mar. 4, 1992), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 4.
76
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employ informal shorthand abbreviations, so they cannot always be clearly
understood.87 At the conference, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the
South Carolina Supreme Court’s reliance on Mugler, which he thought
was inconsistent with modern regulatory takings cases.88 Justices
Kennedy, O’Connor, and White all seemed to think that the case should
be decided as a temporary taking, focusing just on the period from 1988
to 1990, when the special permit provision was added.89 Justice Scalia
agreed that that he could accept treating the case as a temporary taking but
argued for addressing it as a permanent taking.90 He argued, as he
eventually wrote in his opinion, that the Court could ignore any need for
Lucas to apply for a permit because ripeness is prudential rather than
jurisdictional.91 He stated that the South Carolina Supreme Court had
skipped it, so the U.S. Supreme Court need not limit its analysis.92 Justice
Scalia also stated his agreement with Chief Justice Rehnquist on the
merits.93 He said, according to Justice Blackmun, that the state would need
to show something “akin to CL nuisance – need > [than] we have here.”94
He also appears to have stated that the burden of showing this is on the
state.95 It may be that Chief Justice Rehnquist assigned the task of writing
the opinion to Scalia because of his clear view about treating the taking as
permanent and suggesting the doctrinal means to cut down on the scope of
the harmful use precedents.
Justice Scalia circulated his first opinion on June 1.96 He framed the
question to be addressed in the manner most congenial to his purpose, as
87

See id.
See id. Blackmun reported this as Rehnquist’s view: “SC Ct did not rely on admin
excep – went to Mugler – 88 – 90 no permit proc – in old cases all use went out – this type
a not suff to bring us + nuisance line of a cases – real is terms of just comp cases i.e. Penn
Central.” Id.
89
See id.; see also Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor (Nov. 4, 1991), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 4.
90
See generally Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Antonin Scalia (June
25, 1992), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 4.
91
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1062 (1992).
92
See id. at 1011.
93
See id. at 1025.
94
Memorandum: Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council Merit Council Notes from Justice
Harry A. Blackmun, (Mar. 4, 1992), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 4.
95
See id.
96
The Blackmun papers show that Scalia circulated three drafts of his opinion. The
major changes occurred between drafts one and two, as Justice Scalia spiritedly responded
to the dissents. Justice Blackmun’s law clerk reported to him on June 25: “I talked to
88
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a challenge to the pre-1990 statute where “as the Act then read, the taking
was unconditional and permanent.”97 He dispatched any lingering concern
about how the relevance of the 1990 special permit amendment might
qualify the question by stating that ripeness concerns are prudential, that
the South Carolina Court had “shrugged off” its relevance, and that Lucas
would be free to seek a “permit under the 1990 amendment for future
construction, and challenging, on takings grounds, any denial.”98
Chief Justice Rehnquist quickly joined the opinion and made an
important suggestion to strengthen constitutional property rights. In a
memorandum of June 3, 1990, he urged Justice Scalia to include language
that would “distance itself a bit more from” the use of “the ‘noxious use’
line of cases . . . even when there may not be a denial of all economically
viable use.”99 Justice Scalia adapted Chief Justice Rehnquist’s suggested
language and added to the opinion:
When it is understood that “prevention of harmful
use” was merely our early formulation of the police power
justification necessary to sustain (without compensation)
any regulatory diminution in value; and that the distinction between regulation that “prevents harmful use”
and that which “confers benefits” is difficult, if not
impossible, to discern on an objective, value-free basis; it
becomes self-evident that noxious-use logic cannot serve
as a touchstone to distinguish regulatory “takings”—
which require compensation—from regulatory deprivations that do not require compensation.100
Thus, the Court rejected the Solicitor General’s contention that there was
some range of cases where no taking should be found because a prohibited
use imposed serious harm on the public but did not amount to a common
law nuisance.101 Justice Scalia’s opinion treated the Mugler line of cases
as being only historic artifacts.
Scalia’s clerk. AS himself read our dissent and got so angry, he has decided to extensively
respond (and do so nastily).” Note from Law Clerk Justice Harry A. Blackmun (June 25,
1990), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 4.
97
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1011–12.
98
Id. at 1011.
99
Letter from Chief Justice William Rehnquist to Justice Antonin Scalia (June 3,
1992), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 4.
100
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026.
101
See id. at 1010.
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All of the factors discussed in Part III indicate that the Justices most
eager to promote constitutional property rights identified the case as
ideally suited to creating a new per se rule and fought off concerns that
might not cleanly present an opportunity to fashion a distinct rule for the
elimination of all economic value. The very artificiality of the case made
it a convenient vehicle. The applicability of the Penn Central approach
could be ignored.102 The clean concession by the state that no permit would
be granted, the unquestioned but implausible trial court finding that the
regulation had eliminated all economically viable use, the broadly
categorical decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court, and its general
reliance on broad legislative findings of purpose all contributed to an
opportunity for the U.S. Supreme Court to make new law, which the more
determined Justices were not going to pass up.

IV. REACH
What did Lucas accomplish? Primarily, it created a per se rule based
entirely on economic impact.103 The Court credited Agins as having stated
an established rule: a regulation that deprives an owner of all economically
viable use is a taking.104 Rather than admitting that the Agins language was
dicta, the Court simply claimed that they “have never set forth the
justification for this rule.”105 In this context, it is interesting to note that
Justice Kennedy had stated, at conference, that the Agins language is “n[ot]
correct & has t[o] b[e] explained.”106 The Court only offered one
justification for the rule:
102

The most ardent property rights enthusiasts on the Court could not simply jettison
the Penn Central approach. See Letter from Justice Sandra Day O’Connor to Justice Anton
Scalia [I] (June 26, 1992), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 4; Letter from Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor to Justice Antonin Scalia [II] (June 26, 1992), in Blackmun Papers, supra
note 4. In his opinion, Scalia argued that the approach used to determine the relevant parcel
in Penn Central was “unsupportable.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017 n.7. Justice O’Connor wrote
Justice Scalia on June 26 objecting to this reference, stating “I am not prepared to
disapprove of Penn Central as part of the resolution of this case.” Letter from Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor to Justice Antonin Scalia [I], supra. Later that day, she withdrew
her objection after Justice Scalia pointed out to her that he had criticized only the state
court opinion in Penn Central. See Letter from Justice Sandra Day O’Connor to Justice
Antonin Scalia [II], supra.
103
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
104
See id. at 1015–16 (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), abrogated
by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005)).
105
Id. at 1017.
106
Memorandum: Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council Merit Conference Notes from
Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Mar. 4, 1992), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 4.
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[R]egulations that leave the owner of land without economically beneficial or productive options for its use—
typically, as here, by requiring land to be left substantially
in its natural state—carry with them a heightened risk that
private property is being pressed into some form of public
service under the guise of mitigating serious public
harm.107
But the only factual support offered for this peculiar claim of governmental subterfuge was that the federal government sometimes acquired
conservation easements over private land to prevent development, which
could as easily indicate the government’s care in distinguishing regulation
from acquisition.108 The core value in the opinion is found in its comfortable observation that “our prior takings cases evince an abiding concern
for the productive use of, and economic investment in, land.”109
The environmental concerns that motivated the BMA entirely dropped
out of the constitutional analysis. Constitutional protection was conferred
on the economic expectations sanctified in an insider property transaction;
the appropriateness of setback lines on shifting sands, as determined by
science and experience, was never considered. The risks of erosion and
sea level rise were exiled, given that they were not encompassed by the
common law of nuisance. To be sure, the per se rule was limited to the
vanishingly small set of cases where the regulation eliminated all
economically viable use, but, within that set, the Court would not need to
consider the gravity of the harm addressed or the tailoring of the
regulation.110
107

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018.
See John Echeverria & Jeff Pidot, Drawing the Line: Striking a Principled Balance
Between Regulating and Paying to Protect the Land, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10868 passim
(2009).
109
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8. In context, this is a repudiation of the view associated
with Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wisc. 1972).
110
The per se rule also seemed to ignore whether the regulation frustrated reasonable
investment-backed expectations, a key inquiry from Penn Central. See Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 121 (1978). This eliminates the inquiry
into the timing of the plaintiff’s purchase of the land in light of when the regulations were
enacted. Justice Scalia later took the view that this inquiry should be stricken from the
analysis, but the Court has rejected that view. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,
636–37 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring). As noted supra, although Lucas acquired the lots
in 1986, he was deeply involved in the Wild Dunes development and probably was very
aware of the risk of new stronger regulations when he bought the property. See Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1037 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
108
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As a corollary, the Lucas opinion suppressed the Mugler—or noxious
use—line of cases that had given greater leeway to regulate against environmental harms without compensation.111 The Court not only corrected
what the Department of Justice thought was an overbroad reliance on
Mugler by the South Carolina Supreme Court, but completely dropped it
from the takings analysis, relegating it to “our early formulation of the
police power justification necessary to sustain (without compensation) any
regulatory diminution in value.”112 This characterization of the Mugler line
of cases elides the fact that until the 1920’s the Court consistently rejected
any notion that regulation of use could violate the Takings Clause.113 The
characterization is consistent with Justice Scalia’s rather casual acknowledgement that the original meaning of the Takings Clause did not
encompass regulations of use, even though he had treated the original
meaning of the Constitution as inviolate in cases where his understanding
of that meaning more closely matched his policy preferences.114 Justice
Scalia’s approach to regulatory takings cases amounts to a straightforward
declaration of policy-driven constitutional rulemaking.
The Court also argued that the distinction between regulations that
prevent harm and regulations that secure benefits was incoherent: “the
distinction between regulation that ‘prevents harmful use’ and that which
‘confers benefits’ is difficult, if not impossible, to discern on an objective,
value-free basis.”115 The Court suggested that giving effect to the distinction based on the findings of the legislature would result in protection for
the property owner only when “the legislature has a stupid staff.”116 Even
if the determination needs to be based on objective factual analysis, the
judgment regarding the regulation of uses that harm the public must be
normative. All of regulatory takings law rests on assessments of distributive justice.117 Justice Scalia’s criteria seem to confuse a question of
111

See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022–23.
Id. at 1026.
113
Compare Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City & County of San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358,
364–66 (1910), and Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 176–77 (1915), with
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415–16 (1922), and Newton v. City of Cambridge,
277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928).
114
See J. Peter Byrne, A Hobbesian Bundle of Lockean Sticks: The Property Rights
Legacy of Justice Scalia, 41 VT. L. REV. 733, 735 (2017).
115
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026.
116
Id. at 1025 n.12.
117
See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (“The Fifth Amendment’s
guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
112
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judgment with one of fact.118 The underlying normative question is
whether government may prohibit a use of land without paying the owner
the cost of foregoing the use. An environmental approach would take into
account the extent to which the use can reasonably be viewed as noxious,
injurious, or harmful to the public. Surely, one would be justified in
concluding, as an objective matter, that leaching toxins into water used for
drinking harms the public. The fact that some regulations are difficult to
categorize does not invalidate the distinction. Mugler held that the
question of whether a regulation of use prevents harm is reserved for the
elected legislature, reflecting a public judgment, while the court’s role is
to assess if the determination is reasonable.119 In such review, a court
defers to the legislative judgment.120 This was essentially the view urged
by the Solicitor General in Lucas: the case should be remanded for a
factual development to assess whether the degree of public harm prevented
justified the loss that the South Carolina legislature imposed on the
property owner (although with weight given to the owner’s loss as well).121
Justice Scalia’s elimination of the harm/benefit distinction also eliminates
any serious judicial accommodation of regulations that decrease property
values while preventing environmental harm.
This tactic manifested itself also in the opinion when it portrays
regulators as primarily seeking to appropriate private property without
payment.122 In Lucas, where the loss to the owner was found to be
complete, Justice Scalia found “a heightened risk that private property is
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.”); see also Steven Eagle, Penn Central and Its Reluctant Muftis, 66 BAYLOR L. REV.
1, 63 (2014).
118
Perhaps Justice Scalia half remembered Coase’s famous approach to nuisance law,
which eschews ethical judgment about land uses in favor of resolving competing land uses
by attending to the reciprocal nature of liability problems. See Ronald H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 passim (1960). But, Coase did not address
conflicts between an individual landowner and the legislature, which presumably is
empowered to designate the public interest. Moreover, Coase’s analysis operates within
the amoral axioms of the economics discipline.
119
See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (“If, therefore, a statute
purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public
safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights
secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give
effect to the constitution.”).
120
See Kelo v. London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005).
121
See Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 45–46, Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 (No. 91453), 1992 WL 672613.
122
See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018.
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being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of
mitigating serious public harm.”123 But there is no logical connection
between the degree of loss suffered by the owner and the motive of the
regulator. Moreover, the opinion engaged in no actual consideration of the
evidentiary basis or reasoning supporting the limitations on constructing
permanent structures on sands at clear risk of being washed away.
Unfortunately, it was characteristic of Justice Scalia in takings cases to
denigrate the motivations of public regulators rather than engage with the
reasonableness of their work.124
Hostility to environmental regulation was manifest in another feature
of the opinion. Lucas held that property regulations that eliminate all
economic value do not require the payment of compensation only when
they duplicate limitations inherent in the title, primarily those provided by
the common law of nuisance. This approach gives constitutional status to
common law categories. It reverses the previously held judicial view that
statutes properly can remedy inadequacies in the common law created or
revealed by social and economic change.125 As Professor Sax observed,
the opinion posits an entitlement to continue current uses consistent with
the common law:
Though the Lucas majority does not say so explicitly,
its adoption of a standard based upon historically bounded
nuisance and property law reflects a sentiment that a state
should compensate landowners who, through no fault of
their own, lose property rights because of scientific or
social transformations.126
On this point Justice Scalia lost Justice Kennedy, who concurred separately, arguing that the scope of harms that regulators can address without
incurring takings liability is broader than that encompassed in the common
law of nuisance.127
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Id.
See Byrne, supra note 114, at 760.
125
As the Court wrote long ago in the foundational case of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
113, 134 (1877), “A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common
law. . . . Indeed, the great office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they
are developed, and to adapt it to the changes of time and circumstances.” Id.
126
Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1449 (1993).
127
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034–35 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
124
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Critics have often pointed out how ill-suited common law nuisance is
for dealing with environmental harms. The revered nuisance law scholar,
Louise Halper, wrote of Lucas:
The majority . . . strips the legislature of the police
power, an attribute of sovereignty, by claiming that the
public interest which the police power doctrinally protects
does not exist as a formal entity. By giving the judiciary
the power to adjudicate between legislature and landowner, Lucas reduces the police power to no more than
the extension to the commons of the rule of sic utere. The
legislature’s role in land use is limited to codifying the
common law of private disputes.128
Nuisance law has the modest aim to resolve specific conflicts of use
between a limited number of parties, rather than to address broadly
distributed harms.129 Nuisance litigation has a limited capacity to assemble
the relevant information about complex and long term resource
degradation, and judges and juries are poorly equipped to resolve the many
technical issues and tradeoffs of social values inherent in devising a
regulatory approach.130 Nuisance baseline also ignores incremental harms;
128

Louise Halper, Why the Nuisance Knot Can’t Undo the Takings Muddle, 28 IND.
L. REV. 329, 337 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
129
Although the Lucas opinion refers to public nuisance, it erroneously treats that
body of law as merely an application of private nuisance criteria, whereas it historically
has been considered as an expansive legislative power. See id. at 344–46. Indeed, the Court
refers to what the state would have to show in a “common-law action for public nuisance,”
ignoring the historical significance of legislative designations of public nuisances. Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1031.
130
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., Inc., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970), contains
the iconic judicial expression of the inability of nuisance courts to address complex
resource issues such as air pollution:
Effective control of air pollution is a problem presently far from
solution even with the full public and financial powers of government.
In large measure adequate technical procedures are yet to be developed
and some that appear possible may be economically impracticable.
It seems apparent that the amelioration of air pollution will depend
on technical research in great depth; on a carefully balanced consideration of the economic impact of close regulation; and of the actual effect
on public health. It is likely to require massive public expenditure and
to demand more than any local community can accomplish and to
depend on regional and interstate controls.
A court should not try to do this on its own as a by-product of
private litigation and it seems manifest that the judicial establishment is
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it is not just Lucas’s potential houses that create the problem at the shore,
but the overall development, of which Lucas’s homes would be the last.131
Climate change similarly does not fit conventional nuisance law because
no one emitter creates a nuisance; climate change is caused by the
aggregation of emissions since the beginning of the industrial age.132
Lucas also cast doubt on the method that the Court had used to
determine the economic impact of a regulation on a property owner. In
Penn Central, the Court held that economic impact must be measured
against the value of the property as a whole, so that the continuing valuable
uses of a facility, or on a tax lot, would be counted to reduce the measure
of loss.133 Justice Scalia invoked Pennsylvania Coal, the single contrary
decision of the Court in which only the affected portion of the owner’s
property was considered,134 and suggested in Lucas that the Court identify
the relevant unit of property based upon “the owner’s reasonable
expectations [that] have been shaped by the State’s law of property—i.e.,
whether and to what degree the State’s law has accorded legal recognition
and protection to the particular interest in land.”135 Moving the approach
to economic loss that focuses only on the affected portion of property will
neither equipped in the limited nature of any judgment it can pronounce
nor prepared to lay down and implement an effective policy for the
elimination of air pollution. This is an area beyond the circumference of
one private lawsuit. It is a direct responsibility for government and
should not thus be undertaken as an incident to solving a dispute
between property owners and a single cement plant—one of many—in
the Hudson River valley.
Id.

131
See Rose, supra note 36, at 258–61. To prevent the South Carolina court from
giving precedence to public need over private rights, the U.S. Supreme Court used Lucas
as a gateway to supervise state court’s development of South Carolina property law. The
Court warned South Carolina that any effort to examine its nuisance law to extend them to
construction that exacerbates beach erosion “must identify background principles of
nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses” to the satisfaction of the U.S. Supreme
Court. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031. This inversion of federalism nearly came to fruition in Stop
the Beach Renourishment Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 560
U.S. 702 (2010), but Justice Scalia’s invention of the doctrine of judicial takings, whereby
the U.S. Supreme Court would supervise state court development of its common law of
property more generally, to prohibit the elimination of an established property right, was
embraced only by a plurality. See id. at 733.
132
See Michael B. Gerrard, What Litigation of a Climate Nuisance Suit Might Look
Like, 12 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL. 12 passim (2012).
133
See Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124–26 (1978).
134
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
135
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1078 n.7.
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greatly increase the number of cases where the owner has been deprived
of all economically viable uses of the affected property, and thus, the cases
where the Lucas per se rule will eliminate all judicial consideration of the
public interest in environmental regulation.
As noted above, the Court could have decided the case on the merits
in a manner that would have recognized Lucas’s property interest without
ignoring the environmental issues that South Carolina was trying to
address.136 The Court could have applied the more open ended Penn
Central test. It could have vacated the decision of the South Carolina
Supreme Court and remanded the case for a number of unanswered issues:
an accurate calculation of the economic value retained by Lucas, inquiry
into his reasonable investment-backed expectations at the time of purchase, an evaluation of the gravity of the harm that the government was
addressing, and a determination of whether the prohibition on building was
a reasonable measure to address that harm. Whether Lucas had suffered a
taking under such an analysis seems fairly debatable, but such an approach
would acknowledge the legitimate competing interests at stake in implementing a policy of coastal retreat. Such an approach would foster
balancing and accommodate competing private and public interests
instead of marginalizing and trivializing serious environmental concerns.

V. AFTERMATH
The effect of Lucas on government regulators was dramatic. The
opinion was feared to inaugurate a new era of judicial activism protecting
property owners against regulations. Aspects of this view were on display
during our conference in South Carolina. Coastal development continues
unabated without adequately addressing erosion and sea level rise.
Although South Carolina long maintained an official policy of retreat from
the oceanfront,137 it is hard to find decisions that implement that goal.
Rather, state officials seem to view any decision to deny a permit to build
as creating a taking for which the state must pay compensation. What one
encounters at the Isle of Palms, for example, are building adaptations,
136
Candor prompts me to acknowledge my long held view that the entire regulatory
takings endeavor is ill conceived and should be abandoned. See J. Peter Byrne, Ten
Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89
passim (1995). Given that regulatory takings appear to be here to stay, the doctrine should
at least incorporate an honest weighing of competing interests.
137
See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-250, -280. South Carolina recently changed
its policy for beach management from retreat to preservation, South Carolina Beachfront
Management Reform Act, No. 173 (May 3, 2018).
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efforts to find legal means to armor the coastline, and repeated projects of
sand nourishment.138 While regulators are aware of risks, they operate
within perceived tight restraints. Generally, regulator’s fear of takings
liability, litigation costs, and political strife exert a larger effect than the
actual risk of losing takings cases.
But Lucas also generated pushback. Governmental and non-profit
environmental organizations stepped up to critique aggressive regulatory
takings liability rules. The Georgetown Environmental Law and Policy
Institute, formerly led by John Echeverria, issued analytic papers and
organized conferences for government regulators and supporting lawyers
at which doctrine was critiqued and litigation strategy conceived; the
Conference on Litigating Takings Challenges to Land Use and
Environmental Regulations, under the auspices of Vermont Law School,
celebrated its twentieth annual meeting in October 2017.139 Outstanding
appellate advocates, such as Professor Richard Lazarus of Harvard Law
School, brought sophistication to arguments in favor of environmental
regulation. The Community Rights Counsel, led by the late Douglas
Kendall, made major contributions through papers and amicus briefs.140
Though never funded nearly as lavishly as the property rights non-profits,
these efforts brought resources and fresh thinking to regulators feeling
besieged by takings claims. The tide began to turn.
But it was the weakness of Lucas itself that provided the opportunities
for advocacy. It is remarkable that the first forty-three citations to Lucas
reported on Westlaw are all flagged negative.141 The Lucas opinion was
able to evade the Penn Central precedent based on the finding of no
economically viable use of the land, a finding never challenged but also
unrealistic. At that time, Richard Lazarus pointed out: “[B]ecause
environmental protection laws almost never result in total economic
deprivations, that categorical presumption will rarely apply. Instead, the
negative implication of the category’s nonapplicability will dominate the
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See generally Beach Restoration, CITY OF ISLE OF PALMS, www.iop.net/beachrestoration (last visited Mar. 26, 2018).
139
See generally VERMONT LAW SCH., CONFERENCE ON LITIGATING TAKINGS
CHALLENGES TO LAND USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS PAMPHLET (2017),
http://forms.vermontlaw.edu/elc/landuse/takings17/TakingsBrochure2017.pdf.
140
The Community Rights Counsel became the Constitutional Accountability Center.
For a history of the Community Rights Counsels’ action, see their past newsletters at
http://communityrights.org/CommunityRightsReportNewsletter/Newsletter.php.
141
See 505 U.S. 1003 (click “Citing References”).
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lower courts’ takings analyses. These courts will likely apply the opposite
presumption that no taking has occurred.”142
Subsequent decisions confined the Lucas per se rule to cases of zero
economic value, rendering it a rule that applies to virtually no cases.143
Subsequent decisions also firmly entrenched the property as a whole
analysis of economic impact, making the likelihood of no economic value
vanishingly small.144 The Court also has come to give at least muted credit
to the need for planning and regulation to protect both environmental and
property values, incorporating them into regulatory takings analysis.145
Thus, at least for now, the Court has declined to follow on the charged
ideological ambitions for constitutional property rights that fueled the
Lucas opinion.

VI. CONCLUSION
Lucas failed to contribute to addressing sensibly the conflict between
the value of beachfront development, the harm it imposes on the shore,
and the needs to adapt to erosion and sea level rise. The opinion stands
practically as a barrier to regulations mandating retreat from the rising
seas.146 But retreat will occur. The seas will rise and stay risen, perhaps for
millennia.147 The occurrence of storms is a roulette; some will miss the
South Carolina coast and others will hit. However, sea level rise is more
like gravity; it will be pervasive, irresistible, and for all practical purposes
permanent. But because our property institutions are rigid, retreat will be
142

Lazarus, supra note 9, at 1427 (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 337–38 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632 (2001).
144
See, e.g., Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1938–39 (2017); Tahoe-Sierra, 535
U.S. 302 at 337–38.
145
See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1949–50 (2017) (rejecting regulatory takings claim
because “the governmental action was a reasonable land-use regulation, enacted as part of
a coordinated federal, state, and local effort to preserve the river and surrounding land”);
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messy, expensive, possibly lethal, and damaging overall to the natural
environment upon which we depend.
Lucas excised any constitutional balance among competing interests
by erecting a per se protection of the property interest. Thus, its rhetorical
strategy is akin to denial of anthropogenic climate change, taking off the
table how humans can lessen their contributions to environmental risks
and adapt to changed conditions in a manner consistent with our legal
culture and traditions. Examples of enforced silence surround us. The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recently forbade three of its
scientists who had authored a substantial part of a 400 page report about
the effects of climate change in the Narragansett Bay from speaking at a
conference in Rhode Island about the state of the Bay.148 Political
operative John Konkus, now runs the EPA’s Office of Public Affairs. In
this position, Konkus purportedly
reviews every award the agency gives out, along with every
grant solicitation before it is issued. According to both
career and political employees, Konkus has told staff that
he is on the lookout for “the double C-word” — climate
change — and repeatedly has instructed grant officers to
eliminate references to the subject in solicitations.149
We face unprecedented, existential environmental risks from anthropogenic climate change. We have seen in the past year the new scale of
threats from severe storms and wildfires. The South Carolina coast will
almost certainly undergo catastrophic changes from sea level rise and
storm damage in the foreseeable future. Globally, the scientific consensus
predicts greater heat, flooding, storms, wildfires, drought, desertification,
and ocean acidification.150 We cannot know with certainty what exactly
will occur but the scientific consensus about climate change poses risks
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with a high level of probability that we cannot ignore without surrendering
any claim to rationality or morality.151
Our political and legal institutions, including property law, must adapt
to this new reality. The eclipse of Lucas in regulatory takings jurisprudence offers hope that the Supreme Court no longer sees its mission as
preventing a reasoned accommodation between traditional understandings
of property rights and the urgent need to adapt to sea level rise and other
consequences of climate change. Twenty-five years after it was decided,
we should reject Lucas’s approach to regulatory takings as willful
blindness to accommodate environmental risks.
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